Bureaucratic Responses to Populist Government: Explaining Foreign Policy (Non‐)Change

Abstract Populism has become a defining feature of global politics. As populists become part of elected governments, an increasingly rich literature has been investigating their influence on a country's foreign policy. Nonetheless, such scholarly endeavours have neglected one specific element: the interplay between elective officials and the bureaucracy, notably the diplomatic corps. Through this article, we aim at filling such gap. We address the research question by means of a comparative case study of two populist governments in EU member states: the Orbán Second and Third governments in Hungary (2010–2014 and 2014–2018) and the Conte First government (2018–2019) in Italy. Such cases have been selected for the differences in the case outcomes, the nature of the governing party coalition configuration and the role of the bureaucracy and its capacity to provide policy continuity. We adopt as main theoretical lenses Barr's politico‐strategic approach and Peters' politics of bureaucracy theory. Our findings demonstrate that, following Hermann's categorisation of foreign policy change, the Conte I government underwent adjustment changes, whilst the Orbán executives launched an international orientation change of Hungary's foreign policy. Two factors are key in shaping the outcome of foreign policy change: (i) the governing coalition dynamics and (ii) the extent to which the diplomatic corps conceives of its role as guarantor and guardian of continuity in foreign policy. Length of stay in power plays a key role in shaping the dynamic interactions of these factors and ultimately foreign policy change.