“Don’t You Plan on Voting?” The Motives and Effects of Peer Pressure in Voter Mobilization

This paper studies the motives behind socially pressuring others in the context of voter mobilization. In this online experiment, college students choose whether to send an email that pressures their campus peers to register to vote for the 2020 U.S. Elections. The senders have a negative average willingness-to-pay (WTP) to send the email, meaning they would rather pay than pressure their peers. The experiment reveals two counteracting motives at play. On the positive side, senders believe that pressuring their peers will persuade them to register. On the negative side, they believe that their peers will dislike being pressured, which outweighs the positive motives. However, under anonymous messaging, they become much less sensitive to whether the recipient dislikes being pressured, and their average WTP turns positive. This pattern of behavior reflects voters who are motivated by the prospect of mobilizing their peers, but are restrained by self-interested concerns from social costs or retaliation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Published
2025-04-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00024022
Primary Topic
Social Media and Politics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

“Don’t You Plan on Voting?” The Motives and Effects of Peer Pressure in Voter Mobilization

Woo Jin Kim
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Social Media and Politics
article

“Don’t You Plan on Voting?” The Motives and Effects of Peer Pressure in Voter Mobilization

Woo Jin Kim
article en

Abstract

This paper studies the motives behind socially pressuring others in the context of voter mobilization. In this online experiment, college students choose whether to send an email that pressures their campus peers to register to vote for the 2020 U.S. Elections. The senders have a negative average willingness-to-pay (WTP) to send the email, meaning they would rather pay than pressure their peers. The experiment reveals two counteracting motives at play. On the positive side, senders believe that pressuring their peers will persuade them to register. On the negative side, they believe that their peers will dislike being pressured, which outweighs the positive motives. However, under anonymous messaging, they become much less sensitive to whether the recipient dislikes being pressured, and their average WTP turns positive. This pattern of behavior reflects voters who are motivated by the prospect of mobilizing their peers, but are restrained by self-interested concerns from social costs or retaliation.

Quarterly Journal of Political ScienceVol. 20(2)
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Sage Foundation, University of California, Santa Barbara, University of California, San Diego, Experimental Social Science Laboratory, University of California Berkeley
Openalex Percentile: Top 91%
Social Media and Politics
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“Don’t You Plan on Voting?” The Motives and Effects of Peer Pressure in Voter Mobilization — Woo Jin Kim · Quarterly Journal of Political Science (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS