Using Market Design to Reform the US Electoral College
Abstract No election rules are perfect, but they can be better. The Electoral College is increasingly failing to represent voter preferences in determining election winners. A path to reform begins with identifying election goals and establishing voting rules that best achieve these goals.
Authors
- James W. Boudreau (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2917-2669)
- Timothy Mathews (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1204-8365)
- Peter Cramton (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-1092)
- Jesse A. Schwartz
- Brett Katzman
Institutions
- Kennesaw State University (US)
- Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics (DE)
- University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- The Economists Voice
- Published
- 2025-04-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2024-0076
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00