The First Stage of Analytical Jurisprudence: Empirical Foundations and the Genus-Differentia Method

The subject of this study is the methodological framework manifested in the first stage of analytical jurisprudence. Legal scholarship maintains that analytical jurisprudence originated in the works of the English jurist John Austin, who was influenced by the ideas of his distinguished compatriot Jeremy Bentham. The period dominated by Austin's scholarly project is conventionally designated as the inaugural phase of analytical jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Anglo-American legal theory demonstrates no consensus regarding the explication of methodology during this period. The academic literature presents divergent views: while some scholars contend that Austin failed to develop any methodology distinctive to analytical jurisprudence - with his research representing instead the perpetual application of the classical genus-differentia definitional approach to demarcate empirically observable characteristics of relevant objects - others maintain that Austin conducted a priori analysis, suggesting his methodology was considerably more sophisticated. Proceeding from this dichotomy, the subject of this article involves a problem-theoretical reconstruction of the doctrines of key figures in early analytical jurisprudence through an interpretive methodology. Given analytical jurisprudence's primary focus on examining legal concepts, the reconstruction concentrates particularly on those aspects of their doctrines pertaining to the methods of defining and formulating juridical concepts. This methodological examination reveals that: (1) Austin's jurisprudential project did not adopt Bentham's methodology for handling legal concepts; (2) Austin's principal method for defining legal concepts remained the classical genus-differentia scheme; (3) The methodological dimension of Austin's analytical jurisprudence is more accurately represented as constructing conceptual frameworks for subsequent research; (4) These frameworks manifest in the descriptive and empirical character of the respective methodology; (5) Thomas Holland, the primary popularizer of early analytical jurisprudence, not only remained within these delineated frameworks but perpetuated the use of the classical genus-differentia definitional approach.