Equilibrium Analysis of Electricity Market with Multi-Agents Considering Uncertainty

The engagement of emerging market participants in electricity markets exerts dual influences on price formation mechanisms and operational dynamics. To quantify the impacts on locational marginal prices and stakeholders’ economic interests when EV aggregators (EVAs), cloud energy storage operators (CESSOs), and load aggregators (LAs) collectively participate in market competition, this study develops a bi-level game-theoretic framework for market equilibrium analysis. The proposed architecture comprises two interdependent layers: The upper-layer Stackelberg game coordinates strategic interactions among EVA, LA, and CESSO to mitigate bidding uncertainties through cooperative mechanisms. The lower-layer non-cooperative Nash game models competition patterns to determine market equilibria under multi-agent participation. A hybrid solution methodology integrating nonlinear complementarity formulations with genetic algorithm-based optimization was developed. Extensive numerical case studies validate the methodological efficacy, demonstrating improvements in solution optimality and computational efficiency compared to conventional approaches.