“When in Rome…”: on the Authority of Social Norms

Abstract The debate on moral norms and standards is as old as philosophy itself. But social norms and conventions have finally started attracting their fair share of attention too. Their authority is the topic of two sophisticated books published in the last few years, namely David Owens’ Bound by Convention (2022) and Laura Valentini’s Morality and Socially Constructed Norms (2023). In this essay, I present the theoretical outlooks of these two books and then proceed to criticize both. First, I point out a small but significant flaw in Valentini’s ontological account of social norms, according to which such norms obtain in virtue of the beliefs and commitments of rule-followers. More specifically, I argue that such an account – to make sense – should include a reference to the desires of rule followers too. Then, I develop Valentini’s crucial criticism against Owens, according to which Owens’ account cannot make sense of the obligatory character of certain social norms. In this respect I argue that Owens’ answer to such criticism fails in a way that reveals even deeper flaws than Valentini recognizes.