Narrating and Practising the US–China “Tech War”

Abstract US and Chinese domestic and foreign policies increasingly point towards great-power competition. Technology plays a significant role therein, with the bilateral “tech war” portraying economic and technological interdependence as a national security threat. This represents a significant shift in US China policy, which had, since the Clinton administration, focused on economic engagement. Prominent realist accounts consider this change as the inevitable consequence of shifts in the balance of power associated with China’s rise. We propose an alternative perspective, arguing that the US side of the “tech war” is shaped by shifts in dominant, meaning-making narratives. Based on discursive and practice theories in International Relations, we use the concept of narrative practices to understand this process. Narrative practices emphasize the procedural and relational aspect of narratives, rather than viewing them as something that actors pursue in a limited, strategic manner. Empirically, we trace the trajectory of actors performing changing narrative practices from the Obama to the Biden Administrations. The central focus of the policy shift lies in how these narrative practices are integrated in and sustain two different master narratives. US actors gradually moved away from performing narrative practices of engagement connected to the liberal “capitalist peace” master narrative towards “tech war” narrative practices entrenched in and supporting the realist master narrative centred on great-power competition. We therefore hold that the “tech war” arises from the incremental build-up of social meaning associated with actors performing “tech war” narrative practices rather than a strategically executed narrative plan.