Strategic Deception of Rising States From China: Peaceful Rise and Border Order

Abstract China's policy of peaceful rise emphasizes the dual commitment to peace and rise. However, as China rises on the global stage, it may unavoidably encounter disputes with neighboring countries, which requires China to handle these disputes adeptly to align with its principles of peaceful rise. To effectively manage such disputes, as observed in incidents like the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines and the 2017 Doklam standoff with India, China employs “strategic deception” to address these issues non-militarily and prevent further escalation. This strategic deception includes employing strategic ambiguity, inducement, and limited coercion toward relevant countries, ultimately transforming disputes into nonviolent and peaceful change and fostering a border order conducive to its rise while ensuring peace. Research on “strategic deception” holds significant theoretical importance as an unconventional strategic study, providing valuable insights into China's approach to managing regional stability and security during its rise.

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Journal
Foreign Policy Analysis
Published
2025-02-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraf014
Primary Topic
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Type
article
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0.00
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article

Strategic Deception of Rising States From China: Peaceful Rise and Border Order

Changkun Hou
Foreign Policy Analysis
International Relations and Foreign Policy
article

Strategic Deception of Rising States From China: Peaceful Rise and Border Order

Changkun Hou
article en

Abstract

Abstract China's policy of peaceful rise emphasizes the dual commitment to peace and rise. However, as China rises on the global stage, it may unavoidably encounter disputes with neighboring countries, which requires China to handle these disputes adeptly to align with its principles of peaceful rise. To effectively manage such disputes, as observed in incidents like the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines and the 2017 Doklam standoff with India, China employs “strategic deception” to address these issues non-militarily and prevent further escalation. This strategic deception includes employing strategic ambiguity, inducement, and limited coercion toward relevant countries, ultimately transforming disputes into nonviolent and peaceful change and fostering a border order conducive to its rise while ensuring peace. Research on “strategic deception” holds significant theoretical importance as an unconventional strategic study, providing valuable insights into China's approach to managing regional stability and security during its rise.

Foreign Policy AnalysisVol. 21(2)
National Taiwan University (TW)
Openalex Percentile: Top 91%
International Relations and Foreign Policy
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Strategic Deception of Rising States From China: Peaceful Rise and Border Order — Changkun Hou · Foreign Policy Analysis (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS