Plato on the Reasons for and the Value of Friendship (<i>Philia</i>)

Abstract If one focuses on the Republic, it seems plausible to classify Plato’s ethical outlook as impartial, both in terms of its structure and in terms of its content. The aim of this paper, however, is to examine whether—and if so, to what extent—Plato can equally be regarded as a pioneer of an ethics of partiality. To make a case for this view, I will mainly focus on the case of filial piety in the Euthyphro and the Crito and the treatment of friendship in the Lysis. In the Euthyphro, we are faced with a clash between a paradigmatically impartial view (represented by Euthyphro) and a position that allows partial rules of action (represented by the relatives, and presumably by Socrates). The rationale of the partial position defended by the relatives is grounded in the priority of filial piety, a position that we also find in play in the Crito. Filial piety exempts sons from the moral obligation to correct injustices and permits them not to prosecute their fathers for murder. In the Lysis, we find another possible justification of partial relationships, in particular in the context of a discussion of parental love. I will argue for the thesis that although friendship is always grounded in utility, utility does not fully explain friendship. At least three clarifications and additions are necessary: (3.1) It is necessary to determine more precisely what is meant by utility in each case (this will turn out to be important for distinguishing noninstrumental forms of utility); (3.2) the fact that something is useful to me does not necessarily mean that I have been lacking something; and (3.3) there are forms of philia that have different and more important grounds than utility, and one might understand these as moral grounds.