Using Partial Relationships as a Basis for Ethics: An Ancient Strategy

Abstract This paper offers reflections on the ancient ‘ethics of partiality’ which help to identify both similarities and differences to modern approaches. Those reflections come in three steps. First, I will distinguish between two projects within modern debates on partiality: the project of making room for partial duties and the project of letting partial duties do ethical work. I will argue that, while there is nothing like the first project in ancient ethics—there is no need to ‘make room’ for partial duties because they are already there—we have good reason to assume that ancient philosophers presupposed what the second project wants to establish: a relational view on moral questions. To defend this latter claim, I will then discuss three ancient arguments from different contexts, concerning, respectively, the abolition of the family, our duties towards strangers, and vegetarianism. Drawing on these arguments, I will (i) explain the contrast between strong impartiality and equal partiality, which is useful for characterizing the ancient perspective. I will (ii) show how all three arguments reflect, in some way or other, the distinction between oikeioi and allotrioi, i.e., between those who belong to someone and those who do not. And I will (iii) consider the varieties of a strategy that is usually called ‘extended partiality’. Finally, I will summarize the features of the ancient ethics of partiality, as they have emerged. The paper can be read as an introduction to this special issue.