Vnútroštátny režim zodpovednosti národnej centrálnej banky za škodu spôsobenú pri výkone verejnej moci.

The authors deal with the topic of national central bank’s strict liability regime for damage caused within the exercise of its function as a supervision authority according to current Slovak law. The authors examine the roots of the current act (of 2003) establishing the strict liability of public authorities in general. The current Slovak act on liability of public authorities for damages is largely based on Czechoslovak federal act (of 1969), only distinguishing the role of territorial self-administration bodies on municipal and regional level. Such an extent of overlap between the two acts allowed the authors to discuss professor Luby’s theoretical contribution to the concept of strict liability of public authorities in his monograph of 1971. The authors further discuss a recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJ EU) in case C-45/21 Banka Slovenije. Within its function as a resolution authority, the judgment outlined some boundaries to the liability of Slovenian national central bank for damages. The liability regime of the Slovenian national central bank was based on the elements of „serious breach“ and „due care“. This liability regime was then tested before the CJ EU vis-à-vis the concepts of monetary financing prohibition (Article 123 TFEU and corresponding Article 21.1 of the ESCB/ECB Statute) and national central banks‘ financial independence (Article 130 TFEU and corresponding Article 7 of the ESCB/ ECB Statute). The authors are of the view that, if the Slovenian legislation based on the elements of „serious breach“ and „due care“ basically passed the CJ EU scrutiny as regards both specific national central banks related concepts of monetary financing prohibition and financial independence, the liability regime of Slovak national central bank could be less successful in passing such a scrutiny. Thus, the authors provide some proposals de lege ferenda. Finally, authors also discuss Slovak constitutional court’s decision of 2017 on the nature of supervision (in the financial market) which also supports a move from the strict liability regime of the national central bank to a more relative concept.