Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting

In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider the following question: is there a perpetual approval voting method that guarantees that no voter is dissatisfied too many times? We identify a sufficient condition on voter behavior ---which we call 'bounded conflicts' condition---under which a sublinear growth of dissatisfaction is possible. We provide a tight upper bound on the growth of dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, using techniques from Kolmogorov complexity. We also observe that the approval voting with binary choices mimics the machine learning setting of prediction with expert advice. This allows us to present a voting method with sublinear guarantees on dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, based on the standard techniques from prediction with expert advice.

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Publication Details

Journal
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Published
2025-04-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33529
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting

Tomasz Steifer, Alexander Kozachinskiy, Alexander Shen
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Game Theory and Voting Systems
article

Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting

Tomasz Steifer, Alexander Kozachinskiy, Alexander Shen
article en

Abstract

In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider the following question: is there a perpetual approval voting method that guarantees that no voter is dissatisfied too many times? We identify a sufficient condition on voter behavior ---which we call 'bounded conflicts' condition---under which a sublinear growth of dissatisfaction is possible. We provide a tight upper bound on the growth of dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, using techniques from Kolmogorov complexity. We also observe that the approval voting with binary choices mimics the machine learning setting of prediction with expert advice. This allows us to present a voting method with sublinear guarantees on dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, based on the standard techniques from prediction with expert advice.

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceVol. 39(13)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (CL), Université de Montpellier (FR), Laboratoire d'Informatique, de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier (FR), Institute of Fundamental Technological Research (PL)
Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo
Openalex Percentile: Top 84%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting — Tomasz Steifer, Alexander Kozachinskiy, et al. · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS