The ontological and moral status of whole brain emulations in neo-Aristotelian naturalism

Abstract The prospect of designing whole brain emulations (WBEs) capable of replicating the phenomenological effects of human brains presents a compelling argument for granting robots that implement such technology a human-like moral status. While deontological and utilitarian perspectives struggle to refute this notion—potentially paving the way for recognizing a utility monster—the article proposes that naturalistic virtue ethics offers a more skeptical stance. Drawing on the metaethical and ontological tenets of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, as articulated by Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson, this article challenges the view that WBEs are ontologically and morally largely equivalent to humans. Instead, it argues that WBEs should be regarded as artifacts designed to serve human purposes. The discussion begins by examining analogous cases, such as the status of swamp beings as discussed by Thompson. The analysis is further informed by insights from Thomas Aquinas and contemporary virtue-ethical approaches to the ethics of technology. Ultimately, while the autonomous moral status of WBEs is refuted, the article emphasizes that they occupy a unique position among inanimate representational objects. Since the mental properties of WBEs signify human thoughts and inner experiences, their treatment and use require higher sensitivity and caution from virtuous agents than the treatment of other representational objects, such as virtual characters in video games, that primarily signify the outer appearance and behavior of human beings.