Can the Introduction of Strategic Investors Improve the Investment Efficiency of Start-Ups?—Based on the Empirical Data of GEM Listed Companies from 2021 to 2023

因投资过度和投资不足而导致的非效率投资问题在资本市场中普遍存在，在创业企业中尤为突出。从2009年我国创业板挂牌开市至今，我国的资本市场环境逐步完善，吸引着越来越多的战略投资者参与其中，战略投资者的引入能否改善创业企业投资效率是一个尚无定论、亟待进一步检验的命题。文章运用委托代理角度和信息不对称理论，提出了战略投资者引入对投资效率影响的研究假设，以2021~2023年我国创业板上市公司相关数据进行实证检验。研究结果表明，战略投资者的引入能够一定程度上抑制创业企业的非效率投资，提高其投资效率；且战略投资者的持股比例高会提高创业企业的投资效率；民营战略投资者对创业企业投资效率的影响更为明显。In the current capital market, the problem of inefficient investment caused by overinvestment and underinvestment is still widespread, especially in start-ups. Since the listing and opening of China’s growth enterprise market in 2009, China’s capital market environment has gradually improved, attracting more and more strategic investors to participate in it. Whether the introduction of strategic investors can improve the investment efficiency of enterprises is an open question. Using the principal-agent perspective and information asymmetry theory, this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis of the impact of strategic investors on investment efficiency, and makes an empirical analysis based on the relevant data of China’s GEM listed companies from 2021 to 2023. The results show that the introduction of strategic investors can inhibit the inefficient investment of enterprises to a certain extent and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises, and the high shareholding ratio of strategic investors will improve the investment efficiency of GEM listed companies, among which the private strategic investors have the most obvious impact on the investment efficiency of companies.