Permaculture as Richard Bauckham’s Living with Other Creatures:
To have moral standing to blame is to have a right to blame. But what kind of right is it, and what follows from having or lacking standing? I will argue that moral standing to blame should be understood as a power according to Wesley Hohfeld’s classification of rights (1913). It is a normative power to call for an uptake of blame from someone who is liable to blame, i.e., someone who is blameworthy. The function of standing norms, I will argue, is to protect the freedom and interests of persons who are or could be blamed. I make three further claims in distinction to recent scholarship on standing: I argue that the concept of standing does not apply at all to private blame, only to expressed blame; I claim that standing cannot be understood as only a privilege-right; and I argue that there is not a conceptual asymmetry between standing to blame and standing to forgive.
Authors
- Troy Bierma (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-6432-5338)
Institutions
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
Publication Details
- Journal
- De Ethica A Journal of Philosophical Theological and Applied Ethics
- Published
- 2025-04-09
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.258456
- Primary Topic
- Environmental Philosophy and Ethics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00