Regularities of Wars in the Context of Social Evolution

The article discusses and explains multiple empirical generalizations related to the origins and dynamics of wars of different types made by prominent political scientists and historical sociologists. The generalizations concern the peculiarities of the pre-war periods, which were characterized by escalating conflict rhetoric and mutual provocations. The territorial basis of many military conflicts is examined. Traditional feuds with a series of crises are also fraught with wars. If the parties are roughly equal, wars become protracted and involve adjacent states. Large powerful states (great powers and superpowers) are more likely to start wars. Also considered are the more controversial positions on great power inequality as a factor preventing war, as well as the theory of "democratic peace". The weakness of the normative (moralistic) argument that rulers and elites are more peaceful in democracies is shown. Also unconvincing is the economic explanation, according to which democracies that trade with each other are therefore not inclined to go to war. The strongest is the institutional factor related to the plurality of power actors who can influence decisions. This explanation utilizes the concept of collegial power sharing. A distinction is made between leadership and hegemony in international relations. macrosociology of world history. The following approaches have been used in the context of social evolution and macrosociology of world history: the model of changing phases of social development, the challenge-response scheme, the extended functional model, the alternation of epochs of stability and periods of turbulence, the intersecting epochs of empire expansion and the formation of nation-states. Such epochs are characterized by special — transformational — wars. Fragile, weak, crumbling states can fall into civil wars that involve neighbors and great powers.