Relations Among New CCA Security Notions for Approximate FHE
In a recent Eurocrypt'24 paper, Manulis and Nguyen have proposed a new CCA security notion, vCCA, and associated construction blueprints to leverage both CPA-secure and correct FHE beyond the CCA1 security barrier. However, because their approach is only valid under the correctness assumption, it leaves a large part of the FHE spectrum uncovered, as many FHE schemes used in practice turn out to be approximate and, as such, do not satisfy the correctness assumption. In this paper, we improve their work by defining and investigating a variant of their security notion which is suitable for a more general case where approximate FHE are included. As the passive security of approximate FHE schemes is more appropriately captured by CPAD rather than CPA security, we start from the former notion to define our vCCAD new security notion. Although we show that vCCA and vCCAD are equivalent when the correctness assumption holds, we establish that vCCAD security is strictly stronger than vCCA security in the general case. In doing so, we interestingly establish several new separation results between variants of CPAD security of increasing strength. This allows us to clarify the relationship between vCCA security and CPAD security, and to reveal that the security notions landscape is much simpler for correct FHE than when approximate ones are included — in which case, for example, we establish that multiple challenges security notions are strictly stronger than single-challenge ones for both CPAD and vCCAD security. Lastly, we also give concrete construction blueprints, showing how to leverage some of the blueprints proposed by Manulis and Nguyen to achieve vCCAD security. As a result, vCCAD security is the strongest CCA security notion known so far to be achievable by both correct and approximate FHE schemes.
Authors
- David Pointcheval (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6668-683X)
- Renaud Sirdey (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4720-9269)
- Duong Hieu Phan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1136-4064)
- Sébastien Canard
- Chris Brzuska
- Michel Renard
- Caroline Fontaine
Institutions
- Télécom Paris (FR)
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (FR)
- Université Paris-Saclay (FR)
- Laboratoire d'Intégration des Systèmes et des Technologies (FR)
- École Normale Supérieure (BI)
- Institut Polytechnique de Paris (FR)
- Laboratoire Méthodes Formelles (FR)
- Aalto University (FI)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Published
- 2025-04-08
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.62056/aee0iv7sf
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 7.44
Funders
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche