Global cooperation in nuclear sewage management under the condition of unequal rights distribution of benefits

Abstract The Japanese government has discharged radioactive nuclear sewage from the Fukushima nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean, which will cause catastrophic and irreversible pollution of the marine ecology. In this paper, after demonstrating that cooperation has economies of scale, an improved shapley value is devised to rationally distribute the benefits across participating countries. The results of the study show that, firstly, as the alliance expands, the new member states create economies of scale for the alliance countries. Secondly, the traditional shapley value has the effect of calculating invalid coalitions, and the calculation results are unfair to “bridge countries”. Thirdly, whether the specific self‐benefits of countries other than the “bridge countries” are lost depends on the different conditions of this paper's calculation. This paper aims to use economic cooperation to promote a positive response to nuclear sewage disposal and to contribute to the progress of the global environment.