Cybersecurity Threats in Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Navigating Canals and Narrow Channels: A Risk Assessment Using STPA-Safety/Security and Fuzzy-AHP

Abstract Maritime canals and narrow channels are critical for global trade, yet their confined nature poses significant risks, especially with the increasing reliance on digital technologies in ship navigation. This study investigates cybersecurity threats to Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) operating in these environments, focusing on potential cyber-attacks that could lead to accidents such as grounding, collisions, and loss of propulsion control. Utilizing the System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Safety and Security (STPA-Safety/Security) combined with Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (F-AHP), the study identifies and prioritizes key threats, including GPS/AIS spoofing, communication jamming, and thruster override. Expert input via the Delphi method validates the threat scenarios, providing a comprehensive risk assessment. The findings highlight the urgent need for enhanced cybersecurity measures, such as redundant navigation systems, secure communication channels, and improved operator training. The study contributes to maritime cybersecurity literature by offering a structured methodology for assessing and mitigating cyber risks in autonomous ship operations, particularly in confined waterways.