How the State Discourages Vigilantism—Evidence From a Field Experiment in South Africa

Abstract Mob vigilantism—the punishment of criminal suspects by groups of citizens—is widespread throughout the developing world. This paper sheds light on the relationship between state capacity and citizens’ choice between reliance on the state and vigilantism. I implemented a field experiment in South Africa that randomly varies the capacity of police to locate households. Findings from surveys conducted several months later suggest households that have become legible to police are more willing to rely on police and less willing to participate in vigilantism. An additional information experiment points toward increased fear of state punishment for vigilantism rather than improved police service quality as the likely mechanism. The broader implication is that citizens’ willingness to cooperate with capable state institutions need not reflect satisfaction with state services. Such cooperation can also be due to the state's ability to limit citizens’ choices by ruling out informal alternatives like vigilantism.