“China: Bitter Dish with Complex Garnish”

In mid-late 2024, the priorities of the Chinese leadership shifted towards the economy. The 3rd plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 2024, and the subsequent changes in financial and economic policies are aimed at correcting the mistakes that led to a slowdown in domestic demand and business activity. The CCP leadership saw the risks of not achieving the set targets for the country’s GDP growth of about 5% in 2024. The economic situation remains difficult – most statistical indicators are either unstable or have not reached pre-COVID levels. Against this background, Beijing is launching various measures to support economic growth, mainly through monetary policy mechanisms. On the one hand, these measures will have a positive effect on the short-term dynamics of China’s economic development. On the other, they are probably being adopted late: most of them were postponed until after the 3rd Plenum, and their positive effect will most likely not have time to manifest itself before the final calculation of the rate and volume of GDP by the end of 2024. In addition, they are focused on stimulating supply rather than consumption, the rate of which is still low enough to form and launch a new model of economic growth of the “dual circulation”. In foreign policy, along with maintaining the priority of the Russian and American directions, there was increased military-political activity of Beijing in Southeast Asia and economic activity in Africa. In relations between Russia and China, against the background of the stable development of bilateral relations of the “comprehensive strategic partnership”, the “fields of divergence” in the positions of the parties continued to expand. In the economy, these are problems of cross-border payments. In politics, the “fields of divergence” touched upon the topics of strategic vision of world development, Ukraine, regional conflicts, military cooperation with the United States. In the near future, China, in our opinion, will continue to seek external incentives for economic development – despite the wave-like changing and often unfavorable political background. The PRC will not “withdraw into itself”, will not build a new Chinese wall, will continue to rely on globalization and the unity of world development, in which it assigns itself a leading role.

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Publication Details

Journal
World Economy and International Relations
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2025-69-4-57-69
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Chinese history and philosophy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.20
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“China: Bitter Dish with Complex Garnish”

V. Mikheev, S. Lukonin
1 citations
World Economy and International Relations
Chinese history and philosophy
4.20
article

“China: Bitter Dish with Complex Garnish”

V. Mikheev, S. Lukonin
article en
1 citations

Abstract

In mid-late 2024, the priorities of the Chinese leadership shifted towards the economy. The 3rd plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 2024, and the subsequent changes in financial and economic policies are aimed at correcting the mistakes that led to a slowdown in domestic demand and business activity. The CCP leadership saw the risks of not achieving the set targets for the country’s GDP growth of about 5% in 2024. The economic situation remains difficult – most statistical indicators are either unstable or have not reached pre-COVID levels. Against this background, Beijing is launching various measures to support economic growth, mainly through monetary policy mechanisms. On the one hand, these measures will have a positive effect on the short-term dynamics of China’s economic development. On the other, they are probably being adopted late: most of them were postponed until after the 3rd Plenum, and their positive effect will most likely not have time to manifest itself before the final calculation of the rate and volume of GDP by the end of 2024. In addition, they are focused on stimulating supply rather than consumption, the rate of which is still low enough to form and launch a new model of economic growth of the “dual circulation”. In foreign policy, along with maintaining the priority of the Russian and American directions, there was increased military-political activity of Beijing in Southeast Asia and economic activity in Africa. In relations between Russia and China, against the background of the stable development of bilateral relations of the “comprehensive strategic partnership”, the “fields of divergence” in the positions of the parties continued to expand. In the economy, these are problems of cross-border payments. In politics, the “fields of divergence” touched upon the topics of strategic vision of world development, Ukraine, regional conflicts, military cooperation with the United States. In the near future, China, in our opinion, will continue to seek external incentives for economic development – despite the wave-like changing and often unfavorable political background. The PRC will not “withdraw into itself”, will not build a new Chinese wall, will continue to rely on globalization and the unity of world development, in which it assigns itself a leading role.

World Economy and International RelationsVol. 69(4)
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (RU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Chinese history and philosophy
4.20
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