“A model of perfect virtue”: David Hume, a Proponent of Moral Exemplarism?

Abstract David Hume works with examples of excellent people in many passages of the “Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals” (1751), also offering explanations why these people are praised and what role their being praiseworthy plays for the practical function of morality. What is the purpose of these examples? Do they serve to illustrate a theory of virtues? Or are the examples of excellent people themselves the focus of attention, because it is only by looking at such examples that we can recognise which qualities in people are praiseworthy and why that is so? Linda Zagzebski champions moral exemplarism in her 2017 book “Exemplarist Moral Theory”. According to her, our fundamental value terms as well as our deontic terms are based on the observation of morally excellent people, whom she calls “exemplars”—a virtue, for example, is a trait we admire in an exemplar. Could it be that David Hume was a proponent of a kind of moral exemplarism avant la lettre? I examine the functions of examples of excellent people in the “Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals” in order to answer this question. Furthermore, by studying Hume’s moral philosophy, I hope to gain a better understanding of the nature of moral exemplarism as a theory.