Seeing red: How gerrymandering emotionally mobilizes turnout

Abstract Partisan gerrymandering threatens the health of democracy by manipulating formal institutions away from majority rule. In the conventional formulation, institutional manipulation mechanically alters political outcomes. Yet research has neglected the psychological effects of partisan redistricting, which can provoke an emotional backlash from voters. This study presents a theory of voting behavior in which citizen anger over political machinations incites greater turnout that can, in turn, partially compensate for partisan gerrymandering. The constituents that politicians target for disadvantage are agents who can learn they are being targeted, react emotionally, and become that much more motivated to vote. In two survey experiments on large samples, citizens were randomly assigned to receive information about gerrymandering that aimed to either advantage or disadvantage their party. Advantaged citizens on average feel positive emotions but do not significantly alter their intended turnout behavior. Disadvantaged citizens, on the contrary, report greater amounts of fear and anger. The angry participants declare significantly higher rates of voting intent. The results indicate that institutional manipulation may not result simply in mechanical effects but might also provoke psychological backlash that may be partly offsetting, suggesting an avenue for democratic resilience.

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Publication Details

Journal
Political Psychology
Published
2025-03-29
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.70013
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Social and Intergroup Psychology
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
12.60

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article

Seeing red: How gerrymandering emotionally mobilizes turnout

Hilary Izatt
3 citations
Political Psychology
Social and Intergroup Psychology
12.60
article

Seeing red: How gerrymandering emotionally mobilizes turnout

Hilary Izatt
article en
3 citations

Abstract

Abstract Partisan gerrymandering threatens the health of democracy by manipulating formal institutions away from majority rule. In the conventional formulation, institutional manipulation mechanically alters political outcomes. Yet research has neglected the psychological effects of partisan redistricting, which can provoke an emotional backlash from voters. This study presents a theory of voting behavior in which citizen anger over political machinations incites greater turnout that can, in turn, partially compensate for partisan gerrymandering. The constituents that politicians target for disadvantage are agents who can learn they are being targeted, react emotionally, and become that much more motivated to vote. In two survey experiments on large samples, citizens were randomly assigned to receive information about gerrymandering that aimed to either advantage or disadvantage their party. Advantaged citizens on average feel positive emotions but do not significantly alter their intended turnout behavior. Disadvantaged citizens, on the contrary, report greater amounts of fear and anger. The angry participants declare significantly higher rates of voting intent. The results indicate that institutional manipulation may not result simply in mechanical effects but might also provoke psychological backlash that may be partly offsetting, suggesting an avenue for democratic resilience.

Political PsychologyVol. 46(6)
Binghamton University (US)
University of Michigan
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Social and Intergroup Psychology
12.60
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