Lack of Resolve or Military Infeasibility? Explaining Reduced Punishments during the 1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 2010 Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island

While backing down from its threat would undermine the credibility of the deterrence posture, the defender often chooses not to punish the challenger severely. In cases of direct deterrence failure where significant interests are at stake for the defender, the Rational and Cognitive Models in the deterrence literature primarily attribute the cause of the defender's reduced punishment to concerns about the negative consequences of following through on the threat. However, this article presents a different causal story. It suggests that the defender's limited rapid force projection capability, which hampers their ability to promptly deliver the promised damage to the challenger after deterrence failure, plays a crucial role. By examining ministerial debates in the French cabinet during the 1936 Rhineland Crisis and cross‐referencing memoirs of key government officials and minutes of the National Assembly's Defense Committee regarding the 2010 Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island Crisis, this article demonstrates the model's explanatory power and discusses its policy implications for addressing the fait accompli strategy of revisionists.