The Use of Brain–Machine Interfaces in Human and Nonhuman Beings: Philosophical-Theological Implications for Morality

This article discusses the philosophical-theological implications that derive from scientific evidence in relation to the use of brain–machine interfaces (BMIs). By reflecting on the neuroscientific foundations of human freedom in BMI experiments, the law and ethics scholar Nita Farahany distinguishes between freedom of choice and freedom of action. She argues in favor of the key role played by freedom of action (rather than freedom of choice) to account for legal and moral responsibility. However, despite this, it has been demonstrated that monkeys (similarly to human beings) can use BMIs to perform their desired movements with artificial/robotic arms. I discuss these studies and argue that nonhuman beings can also actualize their intended movements by deliberating through their freedom of action. This strongly suggests that morality is not a uniquely human phenomenon but is also present, although in an “embryonic stage,” in nonhuman creatures. I argue that this can impact the way in which we describe the notion of imago Dei.