Voting Rules, Turnout, and Economic Policies

In recent years, voter ID laws and convenience voting have generated heated partisan debates. To shed light on these policy issues, we survey the evidence on the institutional determinants and effects of voter turnout and broaden the perspective beyond the most debated rules. We begin by discussing the importance of electoral participation both for its consequences on policy choices and for democratic legitimacy. Building on a simple cost–benefit model of voting, we then review (quasi-)experimental research on the effects of voting procedures and of other election rules. Voting procedures primarily affect the cost of participation. The obstacles they create matter more when they occur ahead of the election and when the stakes are not salient, and they matter less when parties mobilize voters against them and when alternative ways to vote exist. Election rules both upstream and downstream from the election operate mostly through benefits, for instance, by affecting electoral competitiveness and the number of candidates. We conclude by highlighting questions for future research.

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Publication Details

Journal
Annual Review of Economics
Published
2025-04-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081624-081637
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Economic Theory and Institutions
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.13
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article

Voting Rules, Turnout, and Economic Policies

Jérôme Schäfer, Vincent Pons, Enrico Cantoni
1 citations
Annual Review of Economics
Economic Theory and Institutions
3.13
article

Voting Rules, Turnout, and Economic Policies

Jérôme Schäfer, Vincent Pons, Enrico Cantoni
article en
1 citations

Abstract

In recent years, voter ID laws and convenience voting have generated heated partisan debates. To shed light on these policy issues, we survey the evidence on the institutional determinants and effects of voter turnout and broaden the perspective beyond the most debated rules. We begin by discussing the importance of electoral participation both for its consequences on policy choices and for democratic legitimacy. Building on a simple cost–benefit model of voting, we then review (quasi-)experimental research on the effects of voting procedures and of other election rules. Voting procedures primarily affect the cost of participation. The obstacles they create matter more when they occur ahead of the election and when the stakes are not salient, and they matter less when parties mobilize voters against them and when alternative ways to vote exist. Election rules both upstream and downstream from the election operate mostly through benefits, for instance, by affecting electoral competitiveness and the number of candidates. We conclude by highlighting questions for future research.

Annual Review of EconomicsVol. 17(1)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE), University of Bologna (IT)
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Economic Theory and Institutions
3.13
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