Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising

Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for internet industry, with ad auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives. Classical auction mechanisms, such as GSP, rely on the independent CTR assumption and fail to account for the interplay among the displayed items, also called as externalities in economics. Recent advancements in learning-based auctions enable the encoding of high-dimensional contextual features. However, existing methods are limited by the ''prediction-before-allocation'' design paradigm, which models set-level externalities within candidate ads and fails to consider the context of the final allocation, leading to suboptimal results. In this work, we introduce Contextual Generative Auction (CGA), a novel framework that incorporates permutation-level externalities in multi-slot ad auctions. Built on the structure of our theoretically derived optimal auction, CGA decouples the optimization of allocation and payment. We construct an autoregressive generative model for allocation, and reformulate incentive compatibility (IC) constraint into minimizing ex-post regret that supports gradient computation, enabling end-to-end learning of the optimal payment rule. Extensive offline and online experiments demonstrate that CGA significantly enhances platform revenue and CTR compared to existing methods, and effectively approximates the optimal auction with nearly maximal revenue and minimal regret.