An Item-Level RFID Investment Decision in Green Supply Chain Considering Information Leakage

The entry of potential competitors disrupts the original market equilibrium, which in turn hinders the adoption of RFID technology. This paper focuses on a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers in a master-slave relationship. It develops a decision model for RFID investment, employing a simultaneous game to analyze how RFID technology influences the revenue and strategic behavior of supply chain members. Based on numerical analysis, the key findings of this study are as follows: (1) The adoption of RFID technology increases the revenue of both retailers to some extent. (2) The incumbent retailer demonstrates a stronger ability to withstand risks. (3) The maximum label cost and revenue-sharing rate that suppliers can bear are influenced by the market equilibrium in the absence of RFID. This study offers both theoretical and practical insights for promoting RFID technology in competitive markets.