Building Institutional Management Capacity Against Electoral Violence: A Case of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and 2023 Elections in Nigeria

This paper provides a new perspective on the institutional management implications of intensified electoral violence in Nigeria. There has been a growing recognition of the role of institutional management in organizational performance such as the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria’s electoral umpire. Yet little is known among scholars about specific institutional management capacity of INEC as Nigeria’s 2023 general election was marred by violence. This paper explores such relationship, it seeks to understand the ways in which electoral violence has become a source of instability in Nigeria and why effective institutional management capacity is necessary. It argues that electoral violence such as chaos, arson, shooting of guns, carting away of ballot boxes etc, have made effective institutional management central to resolving such violence. The paper builds on institutional management theory and seminal qualitative data from the recent European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and International Crisis Group (ICG), to explore the case of Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC)in relation to effective institutional management capacity in contexts characterized by electoral violence. Among others, the study demonstrates that institutional inefficiency and weak organizational capacity such as delay in uploading and transmitting electoral results into the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS)and poor operational capacity of INEC in timely collation of results account for electoral violence. Findings highlight a further management implication of institutional weakness, namely how it could breed ‘inefficiency’ in the electoral system and how such institutional weakness could shape the broader context of persistent electoral violence. Based on the findings, the paper specifically, advances two interrelated arguments. First, a new kind of electoral violence has emerged within Nigeria’s electoral system as a result of institutional weakness of INEC that has (a) increased the incidence and type of electoral fraud leading to crises in Nigeria and (b) the crises have persisted within systemic and complex contexts. Second, this electoral violence has further obscured the links between political actors and institutional efficiency outcomes in ways that make the institutional management capacity of INEC particularly challenging. In the alternative, the paper proposes strategies for effective management and institutional overhaul.