A zetetic approach to perspectivism

Abstract According to perspectivism, what I ought to do depends on my perspective. While recently popular, perspectivism faces a central puzzle. In some deliberative practices, facts outside our perspective are clearly relevant. In deliberation, we are concerned with acquiring new information. In advising, a better-informed adviser possesses relevant information I do not have. The latter case distinctly highlights the challenge: even if you possess better information than me, if your advice is not supported by my available reasons, it is wrong. In this paper, I argue that this puzzle can be solved by a zetetic approach to perspectivism. To that aim, I introduce close reasons, which are facts knowable under specific bounded conditions that can be inferred from intuitive assumptions about inquiry. They can explain the directedness of deliberation and how better-informed advisers speak truly given perspectivism. This paper brings together the hitherto separate debates about reasons perspectivism and zetetic norms.