Laws of nature as results of a trade-off—Rethinking the Humean trade-off conception

Abstract According to the standard Humean account of laws of nature, laws are selected as a result of an optimal trade-off between the scientific virtues of simplicity and strength. Roberts and Woodward have objected that such trade-offs play no role in how laws are chosen in science. We first discuss an example from automated scientific discovery which provides support for Roberts and Woodward’s point that scientific theories are chosen based on a single-virtue threshold. We then use this example to argue that by insisting on a single best theory, Humeans rely on an overly simplistic conception of trade-offs, that this conception should give way to one which allows for a Pareto front of equally optimal theories, and that, given this conception, threshold behaviour for a virtue like strength is compatible with a genuine trade-off and can even play the positive role of a selection criterion.