Optimal Strategy for Task Offloading and Resource Pricing Behavior Based on Blockchain

End-edge-cloud computing improves efficiency and reduces latency by allocating mobile device tasks between edge nodes and cloud servers. However, task allocation and resource pricing in complex multi-user, multi-task environments remain challenging. This paper proposes an end-edge-cloud task offloading strategy based on blockchain technology, utilizing Stackelberg game theory for resource pricing (BMSGRP). We designed a multi-level Stackelberg game model with cloud servers as the leaders, edge servers as the sub-leaders, and mobile devices as the followers. By proving the monotonicity of the overall system benefit model, we derived the unique equilibrium solution. Then, we use blockchain technology to construct a decentralized resource transaction ledger, recording the task offloading and resource pricing results of various devices. We employ the an improved consensus mechanism based on reputation scoring (mRS-DBFT) to ensure the security and transparency of data and transactions. Finally, we evaluated the performance of this strategy through simulation experiments across various scenarios. The results indicate that our method significantly improves system efficiency compared with local task execution and random offloading.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
Published
2025-03-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2025.3551825
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
6.49
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Optimal Strategy for Task Offloading and Resource Pricing Behavior Based on Blockchain

Xue Zhai, Nuanlai Wang, Shanchen Pang, Haiyuan Gui et al.
2 citations
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
6.49
article

Optimal Strategy for Task Offloading and Resource Pricing Behavior Based on Blockchain

Xue Zhai, Nuanlai Wang, Shanchen Pang, Haiyuan Gui, Xiao He
article en
2 citations

Abstract

End-edge-cloud computing improves efficiency and reduces latency by allocating mobile device tasks between edge nodes and cloud servers. However, task allocation and resource pricing in complex multi-user, multi-task environments remain challenging. This paper proposes an end-edge-cloud task offloading strategy based on blockchain technology, utilizing Stackelberg game theory for resource pricing (BMSGRP). We designed a multi-level Stackelberg game model with cloud servers as the leaders, edge servers as the sub-leaders, and mobile devices as the followers. By proving the monotonicity of the overall system benefit model, we derived the unique equilibrium solution. Then, we use blockchain technology to construct a decentralized resource transaction ledger, recording the task offloading and resource pricing results of various devices. We employ the an improved consensus mechanism based on reputation scoring (mRS-DBFT) to ensure the security and transparency of data and transactions. Finally, we evaluated the performance of this strategy through simulation experiments across various scenarios. The results indicate that our method significantly improves system efficiency compared with local task execution and random offloading.

IEEE Transactions on Consumer ElectronicsVol. 71(2)
Institute of Software (CN), China University of Petroleum, East China (CN)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
6.49
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.