Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Different Practical Proposal

Abstract Persson and Savulescu argue that if we continue to pursue cognitive enhancement without also pursuing moral enhancement, then we run the significant risk of a morally corrupt minority causing substantial harm. Conversely, Harris worries that if we stop pursuing cognitive enhancement until moral enhancement has been developed, we will fail to prevent significant suffering and death which could have been prevented with the relevant scientific progress. Aiming to safeguard against these worries, Gordon and Ragonese suggest providing cognitive enhancements exclusively to moral enhancement researchers with the aim of developing safe and effective moral enhancement technology, which can then be distributed to the public and be a prerequisite for undergoing cognitive enhancement. In this paper, I provide novel reasons which count against Gordon and Ragonese’s proposal, namely that it does not do enough to prevent the suffering and death which will result from delaying scientific progress. I then offer an alternative proposal for safe and effective cognitive and moral enhancement which I think fares better. I argue that we should not limit cognitive enhancements to moral enhancement researchers, rather we ought to provide them to individuals involved in research which, if successful, would prevent a great deal of suffering and death. Thereafter, I consider and respond to potential objections.