Escaping a weaponized network: China’s reaction to the United States escalating technology controls

Abstract This paper explores weaponized interdependence and tipping point dynamics. The United States employs export controls to maintain technological leadership and restrict China's access to essential semiconductor technology. Conversely, China intensifies its investment in the semiconductor sector, aiming for technological independence and lessening its dependence on U.S.-controlled technologies. The paper introduces a Stackelberg nested game model to analyze the strategic interactions between the U.S., China, and Chinese semiconductor companies. A tipping point indicates a departure from a unified global network to a polarized structure of technological spheres led by the U.S. and China. Utilizing Bayesian Q-learning, the paper uncovers that continuous escalations could result in detrimental outcomes, including wasted resources and a split global technology regime. The study underscores the limitations of weaponized interdependence as a long-term strategic tool and calls for a recalibration of strategies to prevent irreversible fragmentation of the global technological landscape.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Asian Review of Political Economy
Published
2025-03-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s44216-025-00047-7
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
34.09
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Escaping a weaponized network: China’s reaction to the United States escalating technology controls

Dwayne Woods
4 citations
Asian Review of Political Economy
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
34.09
article

Escaping a weaponized network: China’s reaction to the United States escalating technology controls

Dwayne Woods
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Abstract This paper explores weaponized interdependence and tipping point dynamics. The United States employs export controls to maintain technological leadership and restrict China's access to essential semiconductor technology. Conversely, China intensifies its investment in the semiconductor sector, aiming for technological independence and lessening its dependence on U.S.-controlled technologies. The paper introduces a Stackelberg nested game model to analyze the strategic interactions between the U.S., China, and Chinese semiconductor companies. A tipping point indicates a departure from a unified global network to a polarized structure of technological spheres led by the U.S. and China. Utilizing Bayesian Q-learning, the paper uncovers that continuous escalations could result in detrimental outcomes, including wasted resources and a split global technology regime. The study underscores the limitations of weaponized interdependence as a long-term strategic tool and calls for a recalibration of strategies to prevent irreversible fragmentation of the global technological landscape.

Asian Review of Political EconomyVol. 4(1)
Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
34.09
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.