Loss' Analysis of Composition as Identity: Relevant Neglected Consequences and Reflections on Consistency Aspects

ABSTRACT This article partly develops and partly goes beyond Roberto Loss (2022). Like other scholars, Loss (2022) makes use of identity formulas of the form t = tt in the context of plural logic. We focus on the conjunction of two conditions Loss introduces to express ontological innocence as a novelty without any additional commitment. We highlight an unnoticed logical consequence of these conditions, that is, that an entity is not one of itself. Then, we take into account the consistency of Loss' conditions under various aspects. In particular, we prove their inconsistency with a weakened plural comprehension and the unrestricted thesis of composition as identity without resorting to the extensionality of pluralities. Finally, by adopting a more general approach, we reconsider the problem of the satisfiability of Loss' conditions from a formal point of view and we emphasise that the neutral language of Loss' conditions appears to allow even non‐intended non‐mereological interpretations.