How Do Dishonest Reputation Upgrading Cues Affect Reputation-Based Cooperation? The Roles of Trust and Perceived Trustworthiness

The efficiency of reputation in promoting cooperation relies on reputation accuracy. Yet, people often dishonestly upgrade their reputation for potential benefits. To date, it remains unclear whether reputation-based cooperation would break down when reputation systems contain cues of dishonest reputation upgrading and whether trust and perceived trustworthiness could explain this effect. We addressed these questions across three studies (total <i>N</i> = 643) using hypothetical scenarios and incentivized games. In each study, participants interacted with high- and low-reputation targets with or without exposure to cues of dishonest reputation upgrading. Overall, compared to the baseline condition, dishonest reputation upgrading cues undermine cooperation with high-reputation targets, which was explained by lower trust and perceived trustworthiness in these targets. These findings suggest that reputation becomes a less reliable cue for cooperative decisions in reputation systems tainted by dishonest upgrading, reducing the trustworthiness of high-reputation targets and their attractiveness for cooperation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Published
2025-03-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672251324550
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

How Do Dishonest Reputation Upgrading Cues Affect Reputation-Based Cooperation? The Roles of Trust and Perceived Trustworthiness

Yanyan Chen, Baizhou Wu, Junhui Wu, Shenghua Luan et al.
256 links
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

How Do Dishonest Reputation Upgrading Cues Affect Reputation-Based Cooperation? The Roles of Trust and Perceived Trustworthiness

Yanyan Chen, Baizhou Wu, Junhui Wu, Shenghua Luan, Yugang Li
article en

Abstract

The efficiency of reputation in promoting cooperation relies on reputation accuracy. Yet, people often dishonestly upgrade their reputation for potential benefits. To date, it remains unclear whether reputation-based cooperation would break down when reputation systems contain cues of dishonest reputation upgrading and whether trust and perceived trustworthiness could explain this effect. We addressed these questions across three studies (total <i>N</i> = 643) using hypothetical scenarios and incentivized games. In each study, participants interacted with high- and low-reputation targets with or without exposure to cues of dishonest reputation upgrading. Overall, compared to the baseline condition, dishonest reputation upgrading cues undermine cooperation with high-reputation targets, which was explained by lower trust and perceived trustworthiness in these targets. These findings suggest that reputation becomes a less reliable cue for cooperative decisions in reputation systems tainted by dishonest upgrading, reducing the trustworthiness of high-reputation targets and their attractiveness for cooperation.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN), University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 92%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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