There is only one truth, the objective truth, in recovered memory cases

Nachson (2025) provides a clear and logical review of the scientific literature about the repressed memory controversy, concluding that there is no credible scientific evidence which supports the concept of traumatic repression: “the theory cannot be empirically validated, and it therefore has no scientific value” (p. 5). We endorse this position. As Larry Weiskrantz asserted: “repression is a theory, not a fact” (Weiskrantz, 2007, p. 81). Nachson adopts a novel approach in attempting to accommodate a middle ground regarding multiple, alternative truths—scientific, legal, and therapeutic—with reference to three cases heard by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court has on the one hand accepted the problematic nature of recovered memories. Yet, on the other hand, it has demonstrated that it will allow recovered memory testimony into evidence, with the caveat that additional corroborative evidence also be present before someone is convicted. This doublethink is concerning because the admission of repressed memory testimony could contaminate a case, and the standard for what constitutes “corroborating evidence” could be low (e.g., it could include testimony contaminated by the repressed memory recovery). There is a real danger that miscarriages of justice can occur (see Felstead & Patihis, 2025). The multiple truths approach outlined by Nachson is concerningly postmodern, though it seems he is advocating at times that the factual truth determines cases. Our position is that there is only one singular objective truth (“factual truth” as phrased by Nachson). This has been the approach of an extraordinarily successful scientific enterprise over a few hundred years. The objective truth is the most important element for all involved. We do not agree that the factual truth can take a back seat to wellbeing in therapy (“therapeutic truth”). We do not agree that judges can change the course of justice by sidestepping the objective truth either (“judicial truth”). If we agree that the concept of repressed memory is unsound, then there is no place in any criminal court for “therapeutic truths.” The telling example of Thomas Quick—Sweden's most notorious serial killer who confessed to 39 murders—pinpoints the inherent dangers of accepting “therapeutic truths.” Quick's psychotherapist, the charismatic Margit Norwell, dogmatically assumed that her clients who entered therapy had been abused in childhood. She subsequently helped Quick to recover repressed memories of murder, memories that turned out to be false. Thomas Quick was subsequently wrongfully convicted of eight murders. The last of these convictions was thankfully overturned in 2013, following the largest forensic investigation in Sweden since the second world war (Josefsson, 2015). In conclusion, Nachson valuably informs us of the Israeli openness to repressed memory testimony, and quite rightly suggest that corroborating evidence should be sought before convictions are made. Nevertheless, his framing of multiple truths is concerningly postmodern and unscientific, although to be fair it may be the case that he agrees with us that the objective truth should determine legal decisions.