Corporate Governance in China: Shareholder Primacy under the Chinese Communist Party’s Influence

China, as a nominally socialist country, has a shareholder-primacy corporate governance model. Chinese company law grants shareholders strong rights, and Chinese companies have concentrated shareholding structures. As a result, shareholders can effectively dominate the board of directors and control the company. However, Chinese shareholders and companies are ultimately subject to the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By drawing on empirical data, this article argues that Chinese corporate governance is sui generis. Shareholder primacy and party influence merge in a party-centered governance model in SOEs with party organizations (the CCP’s grassroots branches) dominating major decision-making. In private companies, shareholder primacy is the norm, and stakeholders are vulnerable to management’s exploitation and opportunism. The CCP sometimes intervenes to protect stakeholders but sometimes sides with companies. Its stance depends on its policy goals, which might vary from case to case and from time to time.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Law and Commerce
Published
2025-03-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5195/jlc.2024.297
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Corporate Governance in China: Shareholder Primacy under the Chinese Communist Party’s Influence

Jie Zeng
Journal of Law and Commerce
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Corporate Governance in China: Shareholder Primacy under the Chinese Communist Party’s Influence

Jie Zeng
article en

Abstract

China, as a nominally socialist country, has a shareholder-primacy corporate governance model. Chinese company law grants shareholders strong rights, and Chinese companies have concentrated shareholding structures. As a result, shareholders can effectively dominate the board of directors and control the company. However, Chinese shareholders and companies are ultimately subject to the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By drawing on empirical data, this article argues that Chinese corporate governance is sui generis. Shareholder primacy and party influence merge in a party-centered governance model in SOEs with party organizations (the CCP’s grassroots branches) dominating major decision-making. In private companies, shareholder primacy is the norm, and stakeholders are vulnerable to management’s exploitation and opportunism. The CCP sometimes intervenes to protect stakeholders but sometimes sides with companies. Its stance depends on its policy goals, which might vary from case to case and from time to time.

Journal of Law and CommerceVol. 43(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 92%
Corporate Finance and Governance
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Corporate Governance in China: Shareholder Primacy under the Chinese Communist Party’s Influence — Jie Zeng · Journal of Law and Commerce (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS