A comment on‚ Dissociative Amnesia: A Valid Construct for Repressed Memories by Hans J. Markowitsch and Angelica Staniloiu

Like Otgaar et al. (this issue), Markowitsch and Staniloiu do not directly address issues regarding the concept of recovered memory. Rather, they examine specific functional and structural correlates of dissociative amnesia (a concept similar to repression) that supposedly underlie the memory processes around which the debate on the validity of recovered memories focuses. Using structural and functional brain imaging techniques, Markowitsch and Staniloiu found a solid basis for dissociative amnesia, which is characterized by a temporary (sometimes permanently) block (repression) of memories of unbearable traumatic experiences that may eventually be recovered, either spontaneously or induced by therapy. Blockage of memories is accompanied by hypometabolism and by specific structural changes in given areas of the brain, and the syndrome is therefore “an objectifiable biologically based pathology”. Specifically, traumatic experiences have been found to correlate with dissociative amnesia. Although correlations of two variables do not imply causal relationships between them, Markowitsch and Staniloiu believe that their data support the idea that traumatic memories might be repressed, because in their practice with about 100 cases of dissociative amnesia, those experiences have been the primary etiological factor. Repressed memories can be recovered; and although they might be false, the authors found all recovered memories that have come to their attention to be true. Markowitsch and Staniloiu therefore conclude that repression of memories, or dissociative amnesia, is a scientifically valid concept. While the authors are aware of the debate between the experimentally- and the clinically-oriented psychologists regarding the validity of recovered memories, they do no actually try to cope with it. The only mediating suggestion that they put forward is that the rift between the two views may be bridged by employing specific interview and questionnaire techniques for memory testing. From a broader perspective, it is difficult to assess the impact that Markowitsch and Staniloiu’s findings might have on issues associated with the “recovered memory hypothesis”, since it is conceptualized in psychological- rather than in biological-terms. Can a biological model account for the variety of psychological manifestations that allegedly accompany the recovering of repressed memories? For example, how does it relate to the claim made by the proponent of this hypothesis that the memories recovered after years of repression are intact? This problem points to the limitation that biological models have in the explanation of behaviour, since processes in a given domain (e.g., biological) cannot in principle account for phenomena in another domain (e.g., psychological). At most, one can point to correlations between the two, leaving causality for speculations. Thus, the proposed model can only show that the concept of repression is conceivable from a biological point of view, and leave all pertinent pro and con arguments to the behavioural scientists.