The Kurdish Question in Iraq (1958-1963)

In Iraq, the Kurdish minority was promised a certain measure of autonomy, especially in education. However, tardiness on the part of the Government and revolts by the Kurds prevented it from being put into effect. In Iran, the Kurds managed to attain a degree of autonomy in the Mahabad area with Soviet aid during the Second World War but lost it again when Soviet troops withdrew. Turkish attempts to assimilate the Kurds were not successful and led to periodic revolts. The Kurdish minority in Syria was not an important political factor. After the 1958 Revolution, Qasim initially found it diplomatic to encourage the Kurds to strengthen his own position. The hopes of the Kurds were turned to disillusionment later by the Government's neglect of them. The development of a group within the Iraqi government favouring closer ties with the United Arab Republic encouraged a leaning towards the Communists, both on the part of Qasim and of the Kurds, who sided with the Government in the suppression of the Mosul revolt of March 1959. Fighting began in 1959 between pro and anti-Communist factions amongst the Kurds, and the latter's desire for independence was stimulated by the government's rejection of a petition for reforms in Northern Iraq. Qasim's policy of arming one faction to control others led to further conflict. By 1961, the Barzanis had gained the upper hand over their tribal enemies and achieved considerable control in the north of Iraq, the success of which brought other tribes over to their side. Qasim claimed to have crushed the revolt, but it flared up again in the following spring and continued until Qasim was overthrown in February 1963. There was no evidence of significant help being sent to the Kurds from outside Iraq. Indeed, Soviet aid to the Iraqi Army adversely affected Kurdish opinion. The Kurdish rebels under Mulla Mustafa were divided into two basic groups, tribal forces and supporters of the United Democratic Party of Kurdistan (UDPK). The Iraqi forces were not effective, although bombing by the air force caused great destruction. By early 1963 most of northern Iraq was in Kurdish hands. After an initial period of friendship, the Communists' interests diverged from those of the Kurds, the Communist line being that the Kurds must work peacefully with other sections of the Iraqi population for eventual autonomy. The Communists' first aim was the establishment of "national democracies" with some degree of autonomy for the Kurds. There was no evidence that the Russians wished to see an independent Kurdish state. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Communists found it politic to pay lip service to Kurdish ambitions, and it suited the Russians to keep the Kurds at an optimal level of agitation for the adverse effect upon Turkey and Iran, and also on the Iraqi government. With the downfall of Qasim, the way was opened for a negotiated settlement between the Kurds and the new Iraqi government, whose outlawing of Communism gave rise to Soviet hostility. Nevertheless, the negotiations broke down, and in June 1963, animosity recommenced. The object of the 1963 revolt was to secure regional autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq. However, a desire for eventual independence and union with Kurds beyond the frontier could not be excluded.