Indian Nuclear Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

This article draws its analytical approach from neoclassical realism (NCR). It focuses on empirical evidence that explains (a) India’s reluctance to adopt nuclear weapons as the basis of national defence; (b) the decision to drop its reluctance and officially make nuclear weapons the foundation of national security; (c) the adoption of a minimalist approach to deterrence as a starting point for national policy; (d) the subsequent partial shift away from minimalism; and (e) the neglect of the conventional-nuclear linkage thereafter. It expands the ambit of NCR by introducing a neglected normative dimension into the theory and bringing out the complexities involved in the theory’s subcategories. It shows how the initial reluctance to pursue a nuclear deterrence strategy was driven by a conscious normative choice, whereas the post-nuclearization process has been driven by both normative restraint and a largely unconscious choice of expanding capability as well as neglecting nuclear–conventional links relating to emergent technologies.