MDPeek: Breaking Balanced Branches in SGX with Memory Disambiguation Unit Side Channels
In recent years, control flow attacks targeting Intel SGX have attracted significant attention from the security community due to their potent capacity for information leakage. Although numerous software-based defenses have been developed to counter these attacks, many remain inadequate in fully addressing other, yet-to-be-discovered side channels.
Authors
- Wenjian He (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6546-6907)
- Yongqiang Lyu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2573-963X)
- Trevor E. Carlson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8742-134X)
- Yuan Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7990-8676)
- Dongsheng Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5779-9026)
- Chang Liu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1834-4958)
- Shuaihu Feng
Institutions
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Huawei Technologies (China) (CN)
- Tsinghua University (CN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-03-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3676641.3716004
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 7.44