Coexistence Of Profit-Seeking And Rentseeking Behaviors As An Evolutionary Stable Strategy In A Large-Population Playing The Field Model

This paper explores the coexistence of productive, profit-seeking behavior and unproductive, rent-seeking behavior using an evolutionary game approach. It identifies a unique Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and shows how the prevalence of unproductive agents directly influences the incentives to either engage in productive activities, modeled on Cournot competition, or participate in rent-seeking contests, similar to the Tullock framework, for a share of the productive sector's output. The paper further explores how institutional factors—such as the marginal return to contest participation and government taxation of the productive sector—affect the spread and persistence of rent-seeking behavior. In line with empirical evidences, the analysis highlights how unproductive behaviors can become entrenched and pervasive within a population, influencing the long-term evolution of economic systems.