Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism

One of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences.