Controlled Preemption: Amplifying Side-Channel Attacks from Userspace
Microarchitectural side channels are an ongoing threat in today's systems. Yet, many side-channel methodologies suffer from low temporal resolution measurement, which can either preclude or significantly complicate an attack.
Authors
- Christopher W. Fletcher (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9995-5995)
- Yongye Zhu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6191-8187)
- Zirui Neil Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7231-7416)
- Boru Chen
Institutions
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-03-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3676641.3715985
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 4.96