National identity after conquest

Abstract Conquering powers routinely adopt state‐directed nationalization projects that seek to make the boundaries of the nation coterminous with the (newly expanded) boundaries of the state. To this end, they implement policies that elevate the economic status of individuals who embrace the occupier's national identity and discriminate against those who do not. This paper develops a formal model that illuminates when such policies succeed or fail. We show that the effectiveness of discrimination hinges on the perceived longevity of occupation. If occupier rule is expected to be short‐lived, discrimination will backfire, as dissident parents transmit the marginalized national identity to their children; intense intergenerational socialization more than compensates for the negative wealth effects of discrimination. If occupier rule is instead perceived to be long‐lasting, discrimination will achieve its intended aims. Case studies on the Chilean occupation of Tacna, Peru (1880–1929), and the Prussian occupation of Northern Schleswig (1866–1920) illustrate the logic.