Abuse of dominance in the EU pharmaceutical sector

This article is a comprehensive review of European Union and national level public enforcement actions in the pharmaceutical sector from 1974 to 2022. Whereas this research demonstrates that competition authorities are increasingly using competition law as a tool to hold pharmaceutical companies accountable in the pursuit of access to medicines goals, it also puts into question the effectiveness of such a policy by highlighting the systemic nature of anti-competitive behaviour in this sector. Indeed, using the ‘structure of crisis’ in the pharmaceutical industry, as coined by Sunder Rajan, as a framing device, this article highlights that each of these abuses is borne out of one of three drug development models that are a response to this structure of crisis: the ‘blockbuster’, the ‘nichebuster’ and merger and acquisition models. When abuses of dominance in this sector are all a response to the structural pressures arising from financialization for short-term high revenues combined with the pipeline crisis and patent cliff, is competition law intervention not simply a Band-Aid solution?

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Competition Law Journal
Published
2024-12-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2024.03.03
Primary Topic
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Abuse of dominance in the EU pharmaceutical sector

Jacquelyn D Veraldi
Competition Law Journal
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
article

Abuse of dominance in the EU pharmaceutical sector

Jacquelyn D Veraldi
article en

Abstract

This article is a comprehensive review of European Union and national level public enforcement actions in the pharmaceutical sector from 1974 to 2022. Whereas this research demonstrates that competition authorities are increasingly using competition law as a tool to hold pharmaceutical companies accountable in the pursuit of access to medicines goals, it also puts into question the effectiveness of such a policy by highlighting the systemic nature of anti-competitive behaviour in this sector. Indeed, using the ‘structure of crisis’ in the pharmaceutical industry, as coined by Sunder Rajan, as a framing device, this article highlights that each of these abuses is borne out of one of three drug development models that are a response to this structure of crisis: the ‘blockbuster’, the ‘nichebuster’ and merger and acquisition models. When abuses of dominance in this sector are all a response to the structural pressures arising from financialization for short-term high revenues combined with the pipeline crisis and patent cliff, is competition law intervention not simply a Band-Aid solution?

Competition Law JournalVol. 23(3)
Openalex Percentile: Top 67%
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
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Abuse of dominance in the EU pharmaceutical sector — Jacquelyn D Veraldi · Competition Law Journal (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS