Basic Epistemic Reasons: An Action‐Theoretic Proposal

ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to argue that the foundations of epistemology are grounded in the theory of rational action. Specifically, I will articulate and defend a version of internalist foundationalism based on a distinctive, action‐theoretic version of non‐doxastic justification. The motivating idea is that the justification for our foundational beliefs is inherited from our justification for antecedent doxastic actions, acts of belief formation, or acceptance. These doxastic actions are members of a general class of actions that I call non‐deliberative responses (NDRs). While NDRs are non‐deliberative, I argue that we can make clear sense of the idea that they have both motivating and normative reasons and, consequently, that their performance is normatively evaluable. If this strategy is successful, the justification of our doxastic actions (and, via the inheritance principle, our beliefs) will be subsumed under more general principles of justified action.