Coups and Punishment in the Constitutional Order

This Essay examines the historical and constitutional foundations of an anti-coup principle in the United States, emphasizing how state-level prosecutions deter and can appropriately punish election subversion. Tracing its roots to English constitutional history and the Glorious Revolution, the anti-coup principle rejects arbitrary executive power. It underscores the need for accountability to sustain democratic norms against presidential self-coup conspiracies. Highlighting how presidential systems are vulnerable to autocoups, the Essay argues that the decentralized nature of American presidential elections and constitutional provisions, such as the Guarantee Clause, empower states to act as guardians against authoritarian threats. It further explores the historical evolution of voting rights through state constitutions. The Essay illustrates states’ foundational role in protecting free and fair elections alongside the federal government, which supports using state prosecutorial power to punish wrongdoers who conspire to overturn lawful presidential elections. The Essay concludes that preserving democratic institutions requires cultural safeguards and the active enforcement of accountability mechanisms at the state level, ensuring that no individual or group undermines the rule of law and citizens’ right to vote with impunity.