Blockchain introduction and channel leadership to combat counterfeit with an e-commerce platform supply chain

Purpose Inspired largely by the industrial practice that several individuals will motivate to combat the counterfeit by introducing blockchain technology with an e-commerce platform supply chain, this paper conducts a game-theoretic model to explore the optimal blockchain introduction decision and its impacts on supply chain individuals. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops three different channel leaderships, including the manufacturer-led channel, the platform-led channel and a cooperative channel of the both, based on which the effects of channel leadership on blockchain introduction decision are explored in the supply chain. Findings With analytical studies, several valuable and significant managerial insights are obtained in this paper. For example, but not limited to, it is found that (1) in certain markets, higher retail prices do not always result in a decrease in demand for both the brand product and the counterfeit; (2) the blockchain introduction cost and the counterfeit quality are the two determinants affecting the optimal blockchain introduction decision, regardless of the blockchain investor; (3) a triple-win situation will occur when the brand manufacturer and platform cooperatively lead the supply chain and introduce blockchain, and a double-win situation holds when each of them independently does. Originality/value These results presented in this paper offer new insights for managers into the timing and target audience for implementing blockchain technology to prevent counterfeits in an e-commerce platform supply chain.